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ABSTRACT
Consequent to the world wide increase of smartphone use, the incidence of malware developed to
exploit smartphone operating systems has exponentially expanded. Android has become the main
target to exploit due to having the largest install base amongst the smartphone operating systems
and owing to the open access nature in which application installations are permitted. Many
Android users are unaware of the risks associated with a malware infection and to what level
current malware scanners protect them. This paper tests how efficient the currently available
malware scanners are. To achieve this, ten representative Android security products were selected
and tested against a set of 5,560 known and categorized Android malware samples. The tests were
carried out using a digital-forensically rigorous testing framework and methodology, which ensures
the scientific validity of the results. The detection rates of the tested malware scanners varied
widely with half unable to detect any samples at all during initial testing. The malware scanners
that were able to detect the samples scored highly with the top four between 97-99% and a fifth
scanner scoring 87%. The results emphasise the need for more complex detection mechanisms and
protections in future versions of Android and the next generation of malware scanners.
Keywords: malware, mobile forensics, Android

INTRODUCTION
The Android operating system and its users
are a significant target for malware developers;
however, many Android users are unaware of
what malware is and the threats associated
© 2016 ADFSL

with it. The first objective of this paper is to
establish whether Android is more susceptible
to malware than other mobile operating
systems and if so, why. Android users that are
more security-conscious will often download
and use malware scanners in the expectation
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that it will protect them from malware, but
the effectiveness of these scanners is yet to be
investigated. The second part of this paper
answers
this
concern
by
testing
a
representative set of malware scanners against
known malware, making use of both static
analysis and virtual devices.
The paper is structured as follows: Section
2 reviews the associated literature review,
while Section 3 describes the research
methodology. Section 4 presents the setup
procedure, while Section 5 provides details on
the testing methodology. The results obtained
through testing are given in Section 6. Finally,
Section 7 concludes the paper.

LITERATURE REVIEW
This section describes the related literature in
three different areas: i) Android operating
system features and malware, ii) the threat of
Android malware, and iii) the effectiveness of
malware scanners in Android.

Malware and the Android
operating system
Android is a mobile operating system based on
the Linux kernel and developed in part by
Google. The operating system was launched in
September 2008 (Morrill, 2008) and has since
grown rapidly. As of 2012, Android has the
largest installed base of any mobile platform,
powers hundreds of millions of mobile devices
and has more than 1 million new device
activations each day (Android Open Source
Project, 2012).
Having the largest market share makes
Android a prime target for malware developers
as they seek to spread infection promiscuously
and to maximise their impact. Moreover,
Motive Security Labs identified in their H2
2014 report what they consider to be key
reasons why malware continues to be a
significant problem in Android, whilst also
performing a comparison with other mobile
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platforms. The reasons mentioned are the
following:
1. Android apps can be downloaded from
third-party app stores and web sites.
2. There is no control of the digital
certificates used to sign Android apps.
3. Android apps are usually self-signed
and can’t be traced to the developer.
4. It is easy to hijack an Android app,
inject code into it and re-sign it.
In terms of other smartphones, such as
iPhone, Blackberry or Windows Mobile, they
make up less than 1% of the infections
observed. The iPhone and Blackberry have a
more controlled app distribution environment
and are thus less of a target (Motive Security
Labs, 2014). Motive Security noted that
Android phones and tablets are responsible for
around 50% of the malware infections
observed. These results are based on analysis
of all platforms, including both desktop and
mobile operating systems.

The threat of Android
malware
To understand why malware is so prolific in
Android, it is important to understand what it
seeks to do and the unique opportunities,
exploiting a mobile operating system present to
malware developers. Zhou and Jiang (2012)
discuss the threat of Android malware. In the
paper, they focus on the Android platform and
aim to systematize or characterize existing
Android malware. In order to achieve this,
they collected 1,200 malware samples that
cover the majority of existing Android malware
“families.” Although this appears to be a small
number of samples by statistical standards, at
the time these samples formed the first large
collection of Android malware sample and
represented the majority of existing Android
malware.

© 2016 ADFSL
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Their findings determine that 86% of the
samples are repackaged versions of legitimate
applications with malicious payloads and can
therefore be broadly categorised as Trojans.
Android users should be aware of this statistic
and should avoid downloading applications
from third parties even if they appear to be
genuine applications. Another finding of this
report is that 36.7% of the collected malware
samples leverage root-level exploits. This result
shows how important it is for Android users to
keep their operating systems “patched” or up to
date. Older versions of Android are potentially
vulnerable to root-level exploits that have since
been patched.
The report found that 45.3% of the
samples have the built-in support of
transmitting background short messages (to
premium-rate numbers) or initiating phone
calls without user awareness. This category of
malware could cause financial penalty to a user
if they are infected as they could incur a large
phone bill that they are required to pay to
their provider. This result also enforces the
previous observation that the Android
operating system should be patched regularly.
This is because in Android 4.2 onwards, a
security mechanism was introduced whereby
the operating system will alert the user before
sending a premium rate SMS message (Eitzen,
2012). The final finding of this report is that
51.1% of the malware samples are harvesting
users’ information, including user accounts and
short messages stored on the phones (Zhou and
Jiang, 2012). The information gathered by this
type of malware could be personally or
commercially compromising and could lead to
crimes such as identify theft for the individual,
or intellectual property and theft of
commercial secrets for a business.
This paper identifies the key threats of
Android malware - information theft and fraud
through the misuse of premium rate texts and
calls. Mobile operating systems, such as
© 2016 ADFSL
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Android, store significant amounts of personal
and business information that is potentially
valuable to malware developers. Secondly, it
finds that mobile operating systems frequently
run on devices that contain SIM cards, making
it possible for malware developers to obtain
money directly through fraudulent phone
charges.

The effectiveness of malware
scanners in Android
A recent paper that discusses the effectiveness
of malware scanners in Android is: “DREBIN:
Effective and Explainable Detection of Android
Malware in Your Pocket” (Arp et al. 2014);
hence-forth referred to as the DREBIN paper.
In the DREBIN paper ten “anti-virus” scanners
were tested “(AntiVir, AVG, Bit-Defender,
ClamAV, ESET, F-Secure, Kaspersky, McAfee,
Panda, Sophos)” against a set of 5,560 malware
samples; the same malware set used in this
research. The paper discusses the creation of
an Android application called DREBIN which
is a lightweight method for detection of
Android malware that enables identifying
malicious applications directly on the
smartphone.
The application was tested on Android and
detects 94% of the malware; however, the
other “anti-virus” products’ detections rates
were checked by uploading the samples to the
VirusTotal website (VirusTotal, 2015) and
recording the result returned by the service.
This disparity of methods renders comparing
results accurately impossible. This is because
VirusTotal does not differentiate between
different products from the same vendor. For
example, the AVG product for Windows
desktop and Android may work differently and
report a different detection rate, but
VirusTotal only outputs a detection result for
AVG as a single result. Further, VirusTotal
does not recommend that its service is used for
this purpose. Under the heading “BAD IDEA:
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VirusTotal for antivirus/URL scanner testing”
on their website’s about page they state:
“At VirusTotal we are tired of repeating
that the service was not designed as a tool to
perform antivirus comparative analyses…”
Those who use VirusTotal to perform antivirus
comparative analyses should be aware that
they are introducing many implicit errors in
their methodology, the most obvious being:
1. VirusTotal's antivirus engines are
command line versions, so depending
on the product, they will not behave
exactly the same as the desktop
versions: for instance, desktop solutions
may
use
techniques
based
on
behavioural analysis and count with
personal firewalls that may decrease
entry points and mitigate propagation,
etc.”
2. Some of the solutions included in
VirusTotal
are
parametrized
(in
coherence
with
the
developer
company's desire) with a different
heuristic/aggressiveness level than the
official end-user default configuration
(VirusTotal, 2015).
For the above stated reasons, the authors
decided to test the detection rates of malware
scanners available on the Android operating
system using the same malware samples. Using
this
method
will
give
an
accurate
representation of the detection rates users
would experience if they were to come into
contact with that malware on their Android
device.

RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY
The key questions this research addresses are
the following:
1. If Android is a particular target of
malware, are there any protections
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against malware within the operating
system itself?
2. What are the threats it poses? This
section of the question seeks to
understand the goals of malware
created for Android and the threat it
poses to users, their devices and data.
3. How effective are malware scanners in
detecting and addressing those threats?
This section of the question focuses on
malware defense and the malware
products created by vendors to protect
against malware.
The first section is best addressed by using
the literature review. Sources that discuss the
evolution of the Android operating system and
malware created were used. The authors also
believe that a literature review is most
appropriate for the second section of the
question. Sources that analyse the goal of
Android malware and the threat it poses will
be used. For the third section the authors
chose to use a testing methodology. We test a
known set of malware samples against ten
representative Android malware scanning
products using static analysis. The results will
be used to determine a detection rate for each
product. The testing methodology was chosen
for the following reasons:
1. The Android operating system is
constantly updated. It is difficult to
find sources that test malware in the
latest versions of Android.
2. Malware scanners and their definitions
are
continuously
updated.
New
malware scanners that may not have
previously been tested against a dataset
may have become available since the
source published, or a product may
have improved its detection rate.
3. Any source that carried out testing
previously is quickly out of date as
definitions in malware scanners are
updated; in most cases daily. By
© 2016 ADFSL
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carrying out our own testing we will
have an accurate, up-to-date snapshot
of the latest products and their
definitions.
4. Using data from third party sources
such as VirusTotal may not give
accurate results.

SETUP PROCEDURE
Selection of malware samples
The authors used the DREBIN malware
dataset (Arp et al., 2014) for testing. This is a
well-defined and ample database of malware
samples. The DREBIN dataset contains 5,550
malware samples collected in the period from
August 2010 to October 2012. Each sample
was uploaded to the VirusTotal (VirusTotal
2015) service and checked against the ten
most common malware scanners, namely
AntiVir, AVG, BitDefender, ClamAV, ESET,
F-Secure, Kaspersky, McAfee, Panda, and
Sophos. Applications were categorised as
malicious only if they were detected as so by at
least two of the products. The dataset also
includes all 1260 samples from the Android
Malware Genome Project (Zhou and Jiang,
2012). Additionally, any samples that were
identified as adware were excluded from the
dataset. The dataset contains malware from
178 different identified malware families with
81.15% of the malware belonging to the top
twenty families in the dataset.
Table 1
The Android Application Package install files.

Reference
APK Name
1CM
com.cleanmaster.security.apk
2Q360
com.qihoo.security-67.apk
3AVG
com.antivirus.apk
4McAfee
com.wsandroid.suite.apk
5AVAST
com.avast.android.mobilesecurity.apk
6Norton
com.symantec.mobilesecurity
7Lookout
com.lookout
8NQ
com.zrgiu.antivirus
9Malwarebytes
org.malwarebytes.antimalware
10Kaspersky
com.kms.free-84.apk

© 2016 ADFSL

Figure 1. DREBIN Dataset, top malware families
(Arp et al. 2014)

The authors selected the DREBIN dataset
as it contains a large number of samples across
a substantial number of malware families,
facilitating a comprehensive comparative test.
The dataset was collected over a long period of
time and is therefore likely to contain samples
targeting devices running both newer and older
versions of Android. The DREBIN paper itself
states that “To the best of our knowledge, this
is one of the largest malware datasets that has
been used to evaluate a malware detection
method on Android” (Arp et al., 2014). When
creating the malware set, a number of steps
have been taken to make the samples more
reliable by requiring the samples to be
categorised as malicious by more than one of
the tested antivirus products and by excluding
adware as it exists in a “twilight zone between
malware and benign functionality” (Arp et al.,
2104).
Version
2.4.9
3.2.1
4.3
4.4.0.392
4.0.7880
3.10.0.2360
9.15-26a3b5f
7.3.12.02
1.05.1.1000
11.8.4.474

APK MD5
114a64167a7e59edc94d708ac2795c01
fa8a0eab6bd5979a8cc13db83d7ffcfe
75d2ee1597a6ed056e9fdee297774fa5
c44c8dc58fb85fa4d935abb0f17370b7
b9a8e4a1ca3fa4414f4b192bb7f09e35
ca366bd072ef1e71598b32a81f8ca8d2
900cc7207cd4bc44aadf1184cfa2b60e
7820cbc011ad8a99b76166557b8e2ed3
8740049b991021df6c42f10ea1102aa6
7c7eef4f24aed445d97f6d21c5319559
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Selection of malware scanners
The authors selected applications to test from
the Google Play Store based on the following
criteria:


Any application that identifies itself
as an antimalware or antivirus
product and appears in Google’s
Play store as one of their “Top
Apps.” Google lists 540 such
applications.



Any application that identifies itself
as an antimalware or antivirus
product and appears in Google’s
Play Store as one of the top

applications for a category, for
example “Top Tools Apps.”
This selection process was limited to the
top 100 applications in each category. The
Google Play store contains the following
categories: Books & Reference, Business,
Comics,
Communication,
Education,
Entertainment, Finance, Health & Fitness,
Libraries & Demo, Lifestyle, Live Wallpaper,
Media & Video, Medical, Music & Audio,
News
&
Magazines,
Personalisation,
Photography, Productivity, Shopping, Social,
Sports, Tools, Transport, Travel & Local,
Weather, and Widgets.

Figure 2 -Creating Android Virtual Devices
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MD5 and SHA1 hashes
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MD5

SHA1

8GB SD – No malware

2bd9ab33caeb1a4a395fbeeb5c3ef66b

8GB SD - With
DREBIN malware
Samples

ed3c60da24fa4f57def5e27a339316ad

12418e0c1428dcff432b4dbbb0a46923a6a74d
7f
872f15461eacb225d56f1ae665960f84f540f373

Table 3
Malware applications selected

Reference
1CM

Application Title

Developer

Version

2Q360

CM Security Antivirus
AppLock
360 Security - Antivirus FREE

Cheetah Mobile
(AntiVirus & AppLock)
Qihoo 360 (NYSE:QIHU)

2.4.9

3AVG

AntiVirus Security - FREE

AVG Mobile

4.3

3.2.1

4McAfee

Security & Antivirus -FREE

McAfee (Intel Security)

4.4.0.392

5AVAST

Antivirus & Security

AVAST Software

4.0.7880

6Norton

Norton Security and Antivirus

NortonMobile

3.10.0.2360

7Lookout

Security & Antivirus | Lookout

Lookout Mobile Security

9.15-26a3b5f

8NQ

Antivirus Free-Mobile Security

NQ Security Lab

7.3.12.02

9Malwarebytes

Malwarebytes Anti-Malware

10Kaspersky

Kaspersky Internet Security

The rationale behind this selection process
is that users will browse the “Top Apps” when
selecting a malware scanning product. Another
method would be to use search terms within
the Play Store, such as “antivirus” and
“malware”. This is problematic due to the
naming conventions of applications, key words
and the search algorithm used by the Play
Store. This would also introduce bias, as key
words and terms we associate with malware
scanners are likely to differ from that of the
average user. The applications listed in Table 3
were selected.
The APK (Android Application Package)
install files were then downloaded for the
selected applications from the Google Play
Store.

Using AVD (Android Virtual
Device)

Malwarebytes
Kaspersky Lab

1.05.1.1000
11.8.4.474

For testing, the authors decided to use
virtualised Android phones by using AVD
(Android Virtual Device) which is included in
the Android SDK. A virtual Android phone
was used for testing each malware scanner.
Each phone was configured in AVD as
illustrated in Figure 2.
Each virtual device is named with the
reference of the scanner to be tested on that
device. The Nexus 5 device template was
chosen and the device was set to run the latest
version of Android (5.1.1 13/04/2015). For the
CPU architecture ARM was chosen so as to
replicate the architecture found on the physical
Nexus 5 phone. Cameras for the device were
emulated, 2048MB of RAM (default) and
200MB of internal storage (default) were
allocated. The virtual SD card (Section 6.4)
containing the malware samples for each device
is attached.

Virtual SD Card
© 2016 ADFSL
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Once the decision to use virtual devices for
testing was made, the authors decided to
create an SD card image for each device using
the Android SDK tool “mksdcard” in order to
load the malware samples onto each virtual
device. The authors created a blank 8GB SD
card using the command: “mksdcard.exe 8G
8GBSD” and mounted the image in Ubuntu
and copied all 5560 malware samples onto the
SD card image, followed by un-mounting the
image. The created image served as the master
file for all the virtual device’s SD cards and
was not used in testing. An SD card image was
made for each virtual device and named after
its reference number used in the test. A virtual
SD card was used, as it was easy to verify all
the samples to be loaded by checking the hash
of the SD card image. Furthermore, using a
virtual SD card is a lot faster than booting the
phone and copying each malware sample
individually.

TESTING
The following steps were followed to test each
malware scanner. It is important that testing
occurs in a forensically-sound environment so
that a third party performing the same tests
would achieve the same results. When carrying
out the testing, the authors adhered to the UK
ACPO (Association of Chief Police Officers)
principles (ACPO, 2012) which provides
guidelines on the handling of digital evidence.
Although these principles are aimed at law
enforcement and admissibility of evidence in
court, they serve as a solid framework for this
type of testing.
ACPO Principle 3 will be
followed and states: “An audit trail or other
record of all processes applied to digital
evidence should be created and preserved. An
independent third party should be able to
examine those processes and achieve the same
result” (ACPO 2012).
Steps to reproduce:
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1. Verify the SD card image to be tested.
The MD5 and SHA1 hash should
match that of the original SD card
image.
2. Configure the Android Virtual device
and attach the applicable virtual SD
card containing the malware samples.
3. Select the device in AVD manager and
select “Start” to power on the device.
4. Locate “adb.exe,” installed as part of
the Android SDK.
5. At the command line, call “adb.exe
shell.” This will provide shell access to
the device.
a. At the shell, navigate to the
mounted SD card using “cd
/storage/sdcard.”
b. Use the ls command to list the
mounted files “ls –la.” If the
samples are listed, the SD card
has mounted successfully.
c. Exit the shell “exit.”
6. Install the malware scanning product to
be tested.
7. Within the emulator window, find and
launch the application.
8. Within the application, ensure that the
most aggressive scanning option is
enabled and that that the definitions
are up to date. This will vary between
applications.
9. Put the device in Airplane mode to
prevent further updating.
10. Begin the scan.
11. Record the result. The detection rate is
calculated based on how many of the
5560 samples are detected.
As it can be seen from Table 4, five of the
malware scanners were unable to detect any
malware samples. The authors decided to carry
out further testing to investigate the possible
cause by appending the .apk extension to a
small set of the samples on the SD card.
Removing the file extension is common

© 2016 ADFSL
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practice when sharing malware samples as it is
thought to help prevent accidental installation
of the malware. The samples selected were:


000a067df9235aea987cd1e6b7768bcc10
53e640b267c5b1f0deefc18be5dbe1.apk



000e0948176bdec2b6e19d0f03e23f37910
676a9b7e7709954614bac79269c36.apk



00c8de6b31090c32b65f8c30d7227488d2
bce5353b31bedf5461419ff463072d.apk
Table 4
Main results

Reference

Table 5
Drebin testing results
AV1
Product AntiVir
Detection 96.41
rate

00ceaa5f8f9be7a9ce5ffe96b5b6fb2e7e73
ad87c2f023db9fa399c40ac59b62.apk



00cf11a8b905e891a454e5b3fcae41f3ed4
05e3c5d0f9c1fce310de4a88c42d0.apk

The
five
samples
were
chosen
alphabetically when the malware set was
listed. The results on this additional testing are
shown in Table 4.

1CM
2Q360
3AVG
4McAfee
5AVAST

Detected
Malware
5532
0
5546
5468
4846

Detection Rate
(%)
99.49640287769784
0
99.74820143884892
98.34532374100719
87.15827338129496

6Norton
7Lookout
8NQ
9Malwarebytes
10Kaspersky

0
0
0
0
5420

0
0
0
0
97.48201438848921

AV2
AV3
AV4
AVG Bit-Defender ClamAV
93.71
84.66
84.54

RESULTS AND
ANALYSIS
The results obtained are illustrated in Table 4.
Both AVG and CM scored over 99%; only
failing to detect 16 and 28 pieces of malware
respectively out of the 5560 samples. McAfee
and Kaspersky had lower, but still high
detection rates. Of the malware scanners that
detected the malware, AVAST scored the
worst, failing to detect over 1 in 10 (87%) of
the malware samples. Q360, Norton, Lookout,
NQ and Malwarebytes were unable to detect
any of the malware samples.
© 2016 ADFSL



AV5
ESET
78.38

AV6
F-Secure
64.16

AV7
Kaspersky
48.50

AV8
AV9
McAfee Panda
48.34
9.84

AV10
Sophos
3.99

The DREBIN paper tested ten antivirus
scanners “(AntiVir, AVG, Bit-Defender,
ClamAV, ESET, F-Secure, Kaspersky, McAfee,
Panda, Sophos)” (Arp et al., 2014) against the
same set of malware samples; their detection
rate findings for these products are
summarised in the table below. It is important
to note that the VirusTotal (VirusTotal 2015)
website was used to calculate detection rates in
this case.
Direct comparisons to the DREBIN results
cannot be made as VirusTotal does not
differentiate
between vendors’ offered
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products. Malware scanning engines from
AVG, Kaspersky, and McAfee were, however,
tested in both experiments. The results are
compared in Table 6 for completeness.
Table 6
Additional testing

Produ AVG/3A Kaspersky/10 McAfee/4
ct
VG
Kaspersky
McAfee
DREB
93.71
48.50
48.34
IN
Paper
Experi 99.74820143 97.482014388489 98.34532374
ment
884892
21
100719
Result
Differe +6.0382014 +48.98201438848 +50.0053237
nce
3884892
921
4100719
+/-

Further testing, using a set of malware
samples appended with the .apk extension,
gave the results presented in Table 7 when
tested against the malware scanners that were
unable to detect any of the malware samples
(2Q360, 6Norton, 7Lookout, 8NQ and
9Malwarebytes).
Table 7
Testing using a set of malware samples appended with the
.apk extension

Reference

2Q360
6Norton
7Lookout
8NQ
9Malwarebytes

Detected
Malware
0
4
5
0
5

Detection
Rate (%)
0
80
100
0
100

As Table 7 shows, two out of the five
malware scanners (2Q360, 8NQ) showed no
improvement in their detection rate when
tested against the “apk malware samples.”
Three out of the five tested malware scanning
products (6Norton, 7Lookout, 9Malwarebytes)
began detecting the samples as malware once
the apk extension had been added to the
samples’ filename. This demonstrates that
these products are not scanning the samples
that do not have an apk file extension. This is
Page 164
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a critical security risk as Android does not
require a file extension to install an
application. With some basic testing using
Android virtual devices, the authors discovered
that when a user opens an application file
without an extension, the Android operating
system prompts the user to choose an
application to launch that file. The top (and
default option) in this case is the Android
package installer. It appears as though
Android uses the file header rather than the
extension
to
ascertain
this.
As
a
recommendation, the developers of these
products should carry out the following to
remedy the situation:


Malware scanning products should
scan all files by default and
examine the file header to ascertain
the file type. The filename and
extension should not be relied upon.



Malware scanning products should
check these files against a set of
known malware signatures; again
the filename and extension should
not be relied upon to do this as
they are easily changed.

Previous major work (DREBIN) had relied
on the use of VirusTotal, a third party analysis
site, which the site owners themselves state is
not fit for the purpose used. In regards to the
static analysis we performed, in which the
malware is not executed, the only factor
affecting the detection rate would be the antimalware application malfunctioning when run
on a virtual device as opposed to a physical
one. In all cases the applications did not report
errors when installed, executed, or when
performing scanning on the virtual device.

CONCLUSIONS AND
FUTURE WORK
This paper presents the threats of malware in
the Android environment. The results show
© 2016 ADFSL
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that half of the Android malware scanners
were initially unable to detect any of the 5560
malware samples. Further testing proved that
the reason for this in three of those products
was that the file extension was used, in part,
to regulate the scanning. This is a substantial
security risk for two reasons: i) a file extension
is easily changed and ii) Android does not
require a file to have an .apk extension to
install it as an application. This paper provides
a snapshot of the current detection rates of the
tested products and identifies a number of key
flaws that could be abused by malware
creators.
In terms of future work, it would be useful
to investigate those products that showed no
improvement in detection rate during the
second part of the experiment. The authors
would also like to further analyse the results of
the top five malware scanners tested in this
paper. It would be interesting to see if there
are any commonalities amongst the samples
that those scanners were unable to detect.
Finally, this paper focused on static
analysis of the malware samples. Static
analysis is the first line of defense against
malware before it is installed or has the chance
to be propagated by users. Many of the
products tested claim that they will perform
analysis of samples at runtime - detecting and
blocking malicious behaviour. By testing both
the static and dynamic capabilities of malware
scanners, a more comprehensive detection rate
could be calculated.
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